

JOINT FLAG OFFICERS WARFIGHTING COURSE
DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY STRATEGY, PLANNING, AND OPERATIONS

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CAMPAIGN PLANNING PRIMER EXERCISE JOINT WARRIOR



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CAMPAIGN PLANNING PRIMER

I. Introduction

a. Background. Campaign planning has been a technique used by famous commanders to synchronize efforts and to sequence several related operations. George Washington planned his campaign of 1781 to coordinate the actions of the French Fleet with his Franco-American land army to destroy the British forces at Yorktown. General U. S. Grant planned simultaneous offensives by Generals Sherman and Meade among others against the Confederacy as his plan for the 1864 campaign. During World War II, campaign planning became essential to coordinate the actions of joint and combined forces in all Allied theaters. As a mature example of campaign planning in the later stages of World War II in the Pacific Theater of War, General Douglas MacArthur issued his Strategic Plan for Operations in the Japanese Archipelago (DOWNFALL) in May 1945. In this twenty-five page document, MacArthur describes how "This Plan of campaign visualizes attainment of the assigned objectives by two (2) successive operations (OLYMPIC and CORONET)." The cover letter describes this plan as a "general guide covering the larger phases of allocation of means and of coordination . . . both operational and logistic. It is not designed to restrict executing agencies in detailed development of their final plans of operation." Unfortunately, during the 1960s and 1970s, campaign planning became virtually replaced at the theater level by the DOD-directed, computer-supported Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) which emphasized deployment planning. Campaign planning received new emphasis after Operation DESERT STORM in which General Norman Schwarzkopf used a campaign plan to guide the synchronized employment of his forces.

b. A campaign plan embodies the theater commander-in-chief's (CINC's) strategic vision of the arrangement of operations needed to attain the strategic objectives assigned by higher authority. It orients on the enemy's centers of gravity; achieves unity of effort with unified action (joint, combined or coalition, and interagency); clearly defines what constitutes success; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning. Two of the most important aspects of this plan are the synchronization of land, air, sea, special, and space forces and the concept for their sustainment. Campaign plans are the operational extension of a combatant commander's theater strategy. They translate strategic concepts into unified plans for military action by specifying how operations, logistics, and

time will be used to attain theater strategic objectives. Through theater campaign plans, combatant commanders define objectives, describe concepts of operations and sustainment, sequence operations, organize forces, establish command relationships, assign tasks, and synchronize air, land, sea, and space operations. Campaign planning is a primary means by which combatant commanders arrange for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within their theater of operations. A campaign plan communicates the commander's intent, requirements, objectives, and concept to subordinate components and joint forces, as well as to parent Services so that they may make necessary preparations. In addition, by means of a campaign plan, CINCs give the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) information needed for intertheater coordination at the national level. A theater campaign plan may be used to justify requirements in the development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

c. Campaigns are conducted in a theater of war: total land, sea, and air space. They may be along more than one line of operation. Theater campaigns synthesize deployment, employment, sustainment, and supporting operations into a coherent whole. Theater of war campaigns seek to attain national and/or alliance strategic objectives. If required, theater of operations campaigns normally seek to achieve theater strategic objectives.

d. Theater campaigns are planned before hostilities and guide execution during them. A theater campaign may consist of a sequence of related unified operations designed to achieve the CINC's objectives. A single campaign is a phased series of major operations each designed to bring about positioned advantage and decisive results from engagements and battles. More than one campaign may be required to accomplish a strategic objective.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING

Combatant commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of theater campaign plans. The campaign plan embodies the combatant commander's strategic vision of the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives.

(Joint Pub 5-0)

II. Campaign Planning JOPES and JSPS

As stated in Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, "Campaign planning can begin before or during deliberate planning but is not completed until crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes. A campaign plan is finalized during crisis or conflict once the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident. However, the basis and framework for successful campaigns are laid by peacetime analysis, planning, exercises, and applying the principles of campaign planning." (Figure 2). For example, in the spring of 1990, Central Command (CENTCOM) reevaluated its OPLANS for the Persian Gulf region in light of new regional strategic and military situations. A new concept outline was completed in late spring. When the decision was made to deploy forces in response to King Fahd's invitation, this plan was selected as the best option, giving CENTCOM the basis for a campaign plan. While important aspects of the planning process for the contingency that actually occurred were quite well along, more detailed planning for the deployment of particular forces to the region and follow-on operations had only just begun.



FIGURE 2 JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING

a. Deliberate Planning Process. The deliberate planning process develops joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. These planning documents include the Secretary of Defense's annual Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and the Chairman's Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP provides guidance to all geographic combatant commanders and Service chiefs for accomplishing military tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. Deliberate planning is a highly structured process that is conducted principally in peacetime to develop joint operational plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents. Deliberate planning is assumptive. Planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military environment in which the plan may be executed. Plans developed under the deliberate planning process vary in detail from Operations Plans (OPLANs) with Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) to Concept Plans (CONPLANS) with or without TPFDD, to Functional Plans (FUNCPLANS). At the combatant command (CINC) level, deliberate planning is normally conducted by the J5, Plans & Policy Directorate. (CJCSI 3122.01)

b. Crisis Action Planning (CAP) Process. Crisis action planning is based on actual events. As the crisis unfolds, assumptions and projections are replaced by facts and actual conditions. Deliberate planning supports crisis action planning

by anticipating potential crises and developing joint operations plans that facilitate rapid development and selection of a course of action. If the actual crisis conditions closely match the assumptions in a deliberate plan then the decision making cycle of CAP can be accelerated. CAP is often conducted in a time-sensitive environment so the process is intentionally flexible. The procedures provide for the timely flow of information and intelligence; rapid communication of decisions from the National Command Authority (NCA) to combatant commanders, subordinate JTF, and component commanders; and expeditious execution planning. CAP places a premium on efficient commander and staff planning dynamics and on concurrent planning between multiple levels of command. At the unified and sub-unified command level, CAP is normally conducted by the J3, Operations Directorate. (CJCSI 3122.01)

c. Campaign Planning. Development of a Theater strategy and campaign planning are the main elements of a CINC's own theater planning process--his means of providing strategic direction and operational focus. These main elements of theater planning are generally related to the established national systems (JSPS and JOPES) as shown in Figure 3. The arrows reflect the non-sequential, concurrent and overlapping planning interactions between theater and national level. Derived from national (and when applicable multinational) guidance, the theater strategic estimate and theater strategy provide the conceptual basis for all campaigns and operations within the theater. Much, if not all, of the work in peacetime analysis, wargaming, deliberate planning, and exercises can serve as the impetus for campaign planning. Fundamental elements of campaign planning are incorporated in deliberate plans to the maximum extent possible. Example of these elements include: phasing of operations; centers of gravity (both friendly and enemy) and the commander's overall intent and intent by phase. Inclusion of these elements provides the NCA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), geographic combatant commander with a basis for strategic planning and decision making and helps establish intertheater priorities and coordination. Additionally, these campaign plan elements provide a focus to those who are responsible for implementing the combatant commanders' guidance during crisis action planning when operation orders (OPORDs) are developed and multiple operations need to be synchronized into a single campaign.




FIGURE 3 PLANNING RELATIONSHIPS

III. Theater Planning Actions.

Theater Commanders perform the planning actions shown in Figure 4. At the strategic and operational levels, the actions portray an orderly series of activities and operations that occur within the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). They assist theater planners to sequence the necessary strategic and operational operations to obtain strategic objectives. These actions capture the elements of campaign planning and are performed continuously throughout the operation. During CAP, assumptions change and plans are adjusted. The theater campaign plan must be flexible. It must be able to accomplish its designed purpose and adapt to changing assumptions, guidance, or situations affecting the desired outcome. The plan should be continually reviewed and revised to ensure it does not become outdated, unworkable, or overcome by critical events. In developing a theater campaign plan, these planning actions provide a process the geographic commander and planners use to review and revise the campaign plan. The national or multinational strategic guidance the CINC receives from higher authority—whether explicit or implicit—drives the process. Strategic guidance is expressed through National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy relative to the deliberate or crisis-action attainment of strategic objectives and guidance. After receiving strategic guidance, the

geographic combatant commander then systematically considers his derived mission, commander's intent, commander's estimate of the situation, strategic concept of operations (including phases), objectives and subordinate tasks, command relationships and organizations, and requirements for supporting plans. The final link in the process is a determination of plan feasibility, acceptability, adequacy, suitability, doctrinal consistency, and requests for change or augmentation. This sequence is a simplified outline of a process that is dynamic and nonlinear. Actions, such as revising intent and estimates, are continuous and concurrent.




Figure 4, Theater Planning Actions

a. Strategic Guidance. Campaign planning may be initiated by a CINC based upon specific NCA/CJCS guidance; national or alliance documents, such as the JSCP, the Unified Command Plan (UCP), or Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Actions Armed Forces*; or from geographic combatant commander initiatives. If the CINC determines that the situation may require some military response, then he will direct the Theater Joint Planning Group (JPG) to form and begin exploring possible courses of action. Considerations for this step of the process include:

- Review current staff estimates.
- Review applicable plans (OPLAN, FUNCPLAN) for the area or the situation.
- Review Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) including:
 - In-place units;
 - Force flow and closure dates.

- Determine potential military or non-military tasks which may be directed by the NCA.
- Determine if the action will be unilateral or combined.
- Determine levels of Host Nation Support which can be anticipated.
- Determine which forces (U.S. and coalition) may be available for planning purposes.
- Obtain from Theater Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) current analysis of threat forces.

b. Derive Mission.

(1) Identify Tasks. Specified and implied strategic tasks are determined from the strategic guidance. Tasks stated or specifically assigned from higher authority are specified tasks. They are what the higher authority wants accomplished.

- After identifying specified tasks, additional major tasks necessary to accomplish the assigned mission are identified. These additional major tasks are *implied* tasks. They are sometimes found in the annexes of the directive from the higher authority or deduced from detailed analysis of the higher directive, known enemy situation, and the commander's knowledge of the physical environment. Implied tasks do not include routine or Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) that must be performed to accomplish any type of mission. Moreover, tasks that are inherent responsibilities of the commander (providing protection of the flank of own unit, reconnaissance, deception, etc.) are not considered implied tasks. The exception occurs *only* if such routine tasks to be successfully accomplished must be *coordinated* or *supported* by other commanders.
- Essential tasks are derived from the list of specified and implied tasks and are those tasks that must be accomplished in order to successfully complete the mission. To properly identify the essential tasks, the CINC and staff must fully understand the intent of the NCA/CJCS. Only essential tasks should be included in the mission statement and the estimate of the situation.

(2) Identify issues that require clarification at the national level or require Inter-agency coordination.

- As part of the mission analysis ensure that NCA aims and intent are clear. Experience has shown that CJCS Warning Orders (WO) do not always state NCA aims as clearly as we could expect. Clarify with the CJCS if necessary. If clarification is not forthcoming, develop "assumed NCA intent" as part of the situation paragraph.
- Additionally, the theater CINC may need to continue planning without resolution of all issues due to their complex or sensitive nature.
- PDD-56 on managing complex contingency operations requires the formation of an interagency working group to assist in policy development, as well as, a "political-military implementation plan." However, PDD-56 unless otherwise directed does not apply to international armed conflict.

(3) Theater strategic objectives accomplish the essential strategic tasks associated with higher objectives and should become the basis for criteria to define the phases of a theater of war campaign or serve as principal objectives for a theater of operations campaign.

(4) Restated Mission. Theater strategic objectives form the basis of the campaign's mission statement. Using these guides, the geographic combatant commander derives the restated theater campaign mission—a strategic mission that accomplishes the purpose of national strategic direction. Initially, the mission may be a general statement of the strategic objectives and their purposes, but it may be refined later after specific tasks and phases have been developed and delineated as a result of the commander's estimate of the situation. Multiple tasks are normally listed in the sequence to be accomplished. Although several tasks may have been identified during the mission analysis, the restated mission includes only those that are *essential* to the overall success of the mission.

- From this restated mission, the geographic combatant commander determines what is to be done, when, where, why and by who. The geographic combatant commander states this derived mission in clear and concise terms that are understandable to superiors and subordinates.

c. Commander's Intent. The CINC provides guidance to subordinate commanders through the application of operational art and the description of his vision. The commander's vision of the campaign's end state and how operations will progress toward that end is the impetus for staff planning actions. This

vision is concisely stated in the commander's intent. The commander's intent comprises two components—the purpose and the vision of the end state—and is further refined during the development of the commander's estimate of the situation. It should not be a statement of a concept of the operation. Nor is it simply commander's guidance, which is provided to the staff during the estimate and planning process. The commander's intent should be a clear, concise, and relatively short statement of the commander's vision of the purpose and end state for the overall campaign, and each phase.

(1) The purpose is stated as "in order to." If the superior's directive also contains an intent statement, that should also be reviewed to help analyze the "purpose" of the campaign. The purpose remains essentially the same if the original mission remains unchanged, unlike tasks that may change during the course of the campaign. The purpose should correlate to the military end states necessary to support the strategic end state (which includes military, diplomatic, economic and informational aspects). The end state can be described relative to the enemy nations' capabilities and/or the condition of own or friendly forces ability to support the strategic aim.

- Examples of military end states affecting enemy forces might describe:
 - Ability to continue aggressive operations,
 - Ability to command and control certain types of operations,
 - Ability to reconstitute forces, or
 - Ability of the remaining infrastructure to support future aggressive operations, etc.
- While the military end state is typically focused on enemy military capabilities, the commander should also consider issues such as the preservation of the infrastructure to support the populace and the attitude of the enemy populace toward a victorious friendly force.

(2) Through the commander's intent, the commander describes the military conditions that the joint force must meet to achieve the campaign's desired end state. The geographic combatant commander then determines the sequence of actions that will produce those military conditions and how best to apply the available resources to accomplish that sequence with minimal risk.

(3) The commander's intent must be crafted to allow subordinate commanders sufficient flexibility in accomplishing their assigned mission(s). The commander's intent must provide a "vision" of those conditions that the commander wants to see after military action is accomplished. The commander must define how his "vision" will be generally accomplished by forces and assets available, and the conditions/status of own, friendly and enemy forces.

(4) The intent statement may also contain an assessment of where and how the commander will accept risk during the operation (See JP 3-0). Guidance on what risk a commander will or will not accept may be given in Commanders Planning Guidance before development of courses of action. Risk may be further categorized as Operational Risk (failure to accomplish the mission) as well as Personnel Risks (dangers and hazards to friendly personnel). Both types should be considered.

d. Commander's Estimate of the Situation.

(1) The Commander's estimate is an essential tool. It documents the decision process used by the geographic combatant commander in choosing his course of action. It becomes the foundation of the strategic concept of the operations and all future planning. It is the statement of the commander's decision process to select a COA. In the estimate, the commander evaluates all the elements of a situation that effect the employment of forces and assets.

(2) Joint publication 1-02 defines the Commander's Estimate of the Situation process as "a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a COA to be taken to accomplish the mission." This geographic combatant commander's study of the situation, coupled with his review of the existing theater strategy and strategic estimate, is a continuous process from which he may decide to:

- Proceed with the original approved base plan (OPLAN, CONPLAN), developed during deliberate planning phase of JOPEs if his assessment shows that the situation is close to that which was originally projected. He and his staff can then verify the original plan and staff estimates and issue guidance for the appropriate modifications.
- Proceed, with modifications, if the future assessment does not match the original plan but does resemble the situation addressed by a developed branch. The

geographic combatant commander can then select the branch that most closely resembles the projected future outcome and modify it.

- Create a new concept more appropriate to the assessed situation than either the base plan or one of its branches.

(3) Joint Publication 3-0 includes an abbreviated description of the estimate process at Appendix B. In this process the analysis of the situation follows mission analysis and commander's intent. Having established what to do (derived mission, purpose, and the vision of the desired end state), the commander must comprehend the factors that influence how he does it. The command and staff should further examine several factors that will affect the completion of the mission. This is necessary to enable the commander to provide proper planning guidance to the staff and subordinate commands before they commence development and evaluation of COAs. In the absence of facts, they must use logical assumptions that might directly affect the mission. These factors include:

(a) Geostrategic factors. Consider the domestic and international context: political and/or diplomatic long- and short-term causes of conflict; domestic influences, including public will, competing demands for resources, and political, economic, legal, and moral constraints; and international interests (reinforcing or conflicting with US interests, including positions of parties neutral to the conflict), international law, positions of international organizations, and other competing or distracting international situations.

- Characteristics of the operational areas of the theater. Analyze military geography (topography, hydrography, climate and weather). Evaluate how weather, light conditions, the environment and terrain affect friendly and enemy forces and capabilities (i.e., C4I, maneuver, employment of special weapons, deception and psychological operations). Assess political, economic, sociological, informational, psychological and other factors including organization, communications, technology, industrial base, manpower and mobilization capacity, and transportation.
- Identify Limiting Factors. These are restrictions placed on the commander's freedom of action. Limiting factors are generally categorized as constraints or restraints. Constraints are "must do" and restraints are "must not do".

-Constraints: Constraints are tasks that the higher commander requires subordinates to perform (for example, defending a specific decisive point, maintaining an alliance, meeting a time suspense, or eliminating a specific enemy force etc.)

-Restrains: Restrains are things the higher commander prohibits subordinate commander(s) or force(s) from doing (for example, not conducting preemptive or cross-border operations before declared hostilities, not approaching the enemy coast closer than 30 nautical miles, not decisively committing forces etc.).

- **Identifying Planning Assumptions:** Assumptions are developed in order to continue the planning process in the absence of facts. Assumptions should be logical, realistic, and positively stated. Assumptions should be re-addressed frequently. Overall, the higher the command echelon, the more assumptions will be made. Assumptions enable the commander and the staff to continue the planning despite the lack of concrete information. Assumptions are *reasonable suppositions that must be made* to work out a problem logically. They are, in fact, artificial devices to fill gaps in actual knowledge, but they play a crucial role in planning. A wrong assumption may partially or completely invalidate the entire plan—to account for such wrong assumption, planners should consider developing branches to the basic plan.
- **Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities.** The challenge for joint force commanders normally is not to amass more data but to extract and organize the knowledge most useful for overcoming the enemy. Two key concepts that integrate intelligence and operations are "centers of gravity" and "critical vulnerabilities". Centers of gravity are sources and/or agents of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance at a given level of war. – what Clausewitz called the 'hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends...the point at which all our energies should be directed'. Examples at the strategic level can be national leaders, a strong-willed national population (the people), a military service or component of it, strong financial resources, or a critical manufacturing resource. At the lower levels common examples are a military force or component of it, or a skilled and inspirational military commander.

- Centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities are linked by "critical capabilities" and "critical requirements". Critical capabilities are the inherent abilities which enable a center of gravity to function as such. To be an effective center of gravity, a national leader, for example, must have the ability to stay alive, stay informed, communicate with government officials and senior military leaders, and remain influential. A national defense industrial base requires the ability to obtain essential physical resources, transport them to manufacturing centers, process them into effective weapons and essential supporting products, and transport those weapons and products to the armed forces. At the lower levels of war an armored force must have the ability to move, shoot, and kill.
- All critical capabilities require essential conditions, resources and means to make them fully operative. These are called "critical requirements". An armored force requires POL and a flexible logistics system. Elite units require *esprit de corps*. Military commanders need intelligence and the means to communicate. We examine critical requirements to discover enemy critical vulnerabilities—actual or potential—which we can exploit to undermine, neutralize and/or defeat his center(s) of gravity. Critical vulnerabilities are those critical requirements or components thereof which are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction or attack (moral/physical harm) in a manner achieving decisive or significant results, disproportional to the military resources applied.
- The concept of centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities is useful as an analytical tool while designing campaigns and major operations to assist commanders and staffs in analyzing friendly as well as enemy sources of strength and vulnerabilities. This analysis is a continuous process throughout an operation. Within the context of pitting friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses, commanders will understandably want to focus their efforts against those objects that will do the most decisive damage to the enemy's ability to resist. But in selecting those objects we must compare their degree of criticality with their degree of vulnerability and to balance both against our capabilities.

- Identification of enemy centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities requires knowledge and understanding of how opponents organize, fight, make decisions, and their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. JFCs and their subordinates should be alert to circumstances that may cause centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities to change and adjust friendly operations accordingly.
- It is also important to protect friendly critical capabilities and critical requirements to prevent the latter from becoming critical vulnerabilities. Examples can be long sea and air LOCs from CONUS or supporting theaters, or public opinion when it is not an outright center of gravity (as was the case for the United States during the latter years of the Vietnam War). In cases when public support is not a center of gravity, friendly strategy and operations will have to be conceived and conducted in such a manner as to preserve the level of public support which does exist.
- Direct versus Indirect. In theory, direct attacks against enemy centers of gravity resulting in their neutralization or destruction is the most direct path to victory—if it can be done in a prudent manner (as defined by military and political dynamics of the moment). Where direct attacks mean attacking into an opponent's strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks. In this way, JFCs will employ a synchronized combination of operations to weaken enemy centers of gravity indirectly by attacking traditional weaknesses, such as seams and flanks, and critical requirements which are sufficiently vulnerable: LOCs, rear area logistics, C2, specific forces or military systems, and even military morale and public opinion.
- Considerations. At each level of war the commander and his staff should:
 - (1) Identify enemy and friendly centers of gravity.
 - (2) Identify those "critical capabilities" inherent in each center of gravity which enable it to function as a center of gravity.
 - (3) Identify those "critical requirements" which enable each of the "critical capabilities" to be realized. (example: if "mobility" is listed as a critical capability for an enemy armored corps at the

operational level, then "an effective POL supply and resupply system" would be an associated "critical requirement").

(4) Identify "critical requirements" or components thereof which are deficient, or vulnerable (or potentially so) to friendly neutralization, interdiction or attack. These are the enemy's "critical vulnerabilities".

(5) Devise a strategy, campaign plan, or plan of attack which takes maximum advantage of one **or more** enemy "critical vulnerabilities". (For a more detailed discussion see Dr. Joe Strange, *Centers of Gravity and Vulnerabilities*).

- **Assess Enemy Capabilities.** The commander must identify Enemy Capabilities (ECs) and then estimate the likelihood of their adoption by the enemy commander. The term *enemy capabilities* is used rather than term *enemy courses of action*, because the focus should be on what the enemy is *physically capable* of doing and *not on his probable intentions*. These capabilities are considered in the light of all known factors affecting military actions, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of enemy forces. The *primary* source of information on enemy capabilities is the J2's *intelligence estimate*. The paragraphs of the intelligence estimate on the enemy situation and ECs are normally inserted verbatim into the Commander's Estimate. Enemy capabilities are considered in the light of all known specific characteristics, including strength, composition, location and disposition, reinforcements, logistics, time and space factors, and combat efficiency.
 - Strengths: List the number and size of enemy units committed and those available for reinforcement in the area. This should *not* be just a tabulation of numbers of aircraft, ships, missiles, or other weapons, *but rather an analysis of what strength the enemy commander can bring to bear in the area* in terms of ground, air, and naval units committed and reinforcing, aircraft sortie rates, missile delivery rates, unconventional, psychological, and other strengths the commander thinks may affect the ratio of forces in the area of operations or the theater of operations.
 - Composition of Forces: This includes Order of Battle (OOB) of major enemy formations, equivalent strengths of

enemy and friendly units and major weapons systems and armaments in the enemy arsenal and their operational characteristics.

- Location and Disposition: This includes geographical location of enemy units; fire support elements; C2 facilities; air, naval, and missile forces; and other elements of combat power in, or deployable to the area of operations or the given theater of operations.

- Reinforcements: Estimate own, friendly and enemy reinforcement capabilities that can affect the forthcoming action in the area under consideration. This study should include ground, naval, air elements; Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); and an estimate of the relative capacity to move these forces into the area of operations or theater of operations.

- Logistics: Summarize such considerations as transportation, supply, maintenance, hospitalization and evacuation, labor, construction, and other elements of logistical support and sustainment.

- Time and Space Factors: Estimate where and when initial forces and reinforcements can be deployed and employed. Such a study will normally include distances and transit times by land, sea, and air from major bases or staging/deployment areas into the theater or area of operations; compute distances and transit times for each own unit/force, friendly and enemy.

- Combat Efficiency: Estimate enemy state of training, readiness, battle experience, physical condition, morale, leadership, motivation, doctrine, discipline, and whatever significant strengths or weaknesses may appear from the preceding paragraphs.

- Develop ECs: Accurate identification of enemy capabilities requires the commander and his staff to think "as the opponent thinks". From that perspective, it is necessary first to postulate possible enemy objectives and then visualize specific actions within the capability of enemy forces that can be directed at these objectives and that *would also affect the accomplishment of one's own mission*. From the enemy's perspective, appropriate physical objectives might include one's own forces or its elements, own or friendly forces being supported or protected, facilities or line of communications, geographic areas or positions of tactical, operational or strategic importance. Potential enemy actions relating to specific physical objectives *normally need to be combined to form statements of ECs*. These

statements should be broad enough so that the fundamental choices available to the enemy commander are made clear. Once all ECs have been identified, the commander should eliminate any duplication and combine them when appropriate.

- List ECs in Sequence of Probability of Adoption: The Commander lists retained ECs in the order that they are *likely* to be adopted based on the analysis conducted above. To establish such a sequence requires an analysis of the situation from the enemy's perspective, with what may be known about the enemy's *intentions*. Enemy intentions should not be applied uncritically, that is, to consider only what one *believes* the enemy will do. *The commander and staff must avoid eliminating any viable enemy EC based solely on perceived enemy intentions.* After listing the enemy capabilities in relative probability of adoption, a listing of associated enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited by own forces should be compiled. This list can be a general list, or tied to specific ECs. This list will aid in subsequent steps when own COAs are compared against ECs and advantages and disadvantages of own COAs are compared.

- Intelligence Considerations. The CINC's requirements must be the principal driver of the intelligence system. Based upon the CINCs guidance, Essential Elements of Information (EEI) are prepared and Requests for Information (RFI) submitted. The J2 can then focus the intelligence effort to collecting, processing, producing and disseminating the required intelligence. (See Joint Publication 2-0). While EEI can be derived from many sources, the estimate process can offer aspects of assumptions, enemy capabilities, geostrategic factors, etc. that need to be clarified by the intelligence system.

(b) Commander's Planning Guidance: The commander approves the restated mission and gives the staff (and normally subordinate commanders) initial *planning guidance*. This guidance is essential for timely and effective COA development and analysis. The guidance should precede the staff's preparation for conducting their respective staff estimates. The commander's responsibility is to *implant a desired vision* of the forthcoming combat action into the minds of the staff. Enough guidance (preliminary decisions) must be provided to allow the subordinates to plan the action necessary to

accomplish the mission consistent with his intent and the intent of the commander two echelons above. The commander's guidance must focus on the *essential tasks* and associated objectives that support the accomplishment of the assigned national objectives.

- The commander may provide the planning guidance to the entire staff and/or subordinate commanders or meet each staff officer or subordinate unit commander individually as the situation and information dictates. The guidance can be given in a written form or orally. No format for the planning guidance is prescribed. However, the guidance should be sufficiently detailed to provide a clear direction and to avoid unnecessary efforts by the staff or subordinate commanders.
- The content of planning guidance varies from commander to commander and is dependent on the situation and time available. Planning may include:
 - Situation
 - The restated mission - including essential task(s) and associated objectives
 - Purpose of the forthcoming military action
 - Information available (or unavailable) at the time
 - Forces available ("allocated") for planning purposes
 - Limiting factors (constraints and restraints) - including time constraints for planning
 - Pertinent assumptions
 - Tentative Courses of Action (COAs) under consideration; friendly strengths to be emphasized or enemy weaknesses the COAs should attack; or specific planning tasks
 - Preliminary guidance for use (or non-use) of nuclear weapons
 - Coordinating instructions
 - Acceptable level of risk to own and friendly forces
 - Information Operations guidance.
- Planning guidance can be very explicit and detailed, or it can be very broad, allowing the staff and/or subordinate commanders wide latitude in developing subsequent COAs. However, no matter its scope, the content of planning guidance must be arranged in a logical sequence to reduce the chances of misunderstanding and to enhance clarity. Moreover, one must recognize that all the elements of planning guidance are *tentative only*. The commander may issue successive

planning guidance during the decisionmaking process. Yet, the focus of his staff should remain upon the framework provided in the initial planning guidance. There is no limitation as to the number of times the commander may issue his planning guidance.

c. Course of Action (COA) Development.

(1) A COA is any course of action open to a commander that, if adopted, would result in the accomplishment of the mission of the campaign. For each COA, the commander must envisage the employment of own/friendly forces and assets as a whole, taking into account externally imposed limitations, the factual situation in the area of operations, and the conclusions previously drawn up during the mission analysis and previous steps of the commander's guidance.

(2) The J2 will continue to provide intelligence updates as the collection plan is implemented to replace planning assumptions with facts as early as possible in the process. The output of COA development is a tentative concept of operation (with sketch if possible) in which the commander describes for each COA, in broad but clear terms, what is to be done, the size of forces deemed necessary, and time in which force needs to be brought to bear. A tentative COA should be simple and complete. It should address all the elements of organizing the battlefield. It should also include key considerations necessary for developing a scheme of maneuver. Normally, the concept of operations for each COA should include:

- When own/friendly forces will be deployed
- How and where own/friendly forces will be employed
- Sector of main effort
- Scheme of maneuver (tentative)
- Major tasks by subordinates (sequenced if possible)
- Concept for sustainment (tentative)
- Preliminary command arrangements

(3) A critical first decision in COA development is whether to conduct simultaneous or sequential development of the COAs. Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of simultaneous development of COAs is potential time savings. Separate groups work simultaneously on different COAs. The disadvantages of this approach are that the synergy of the J2G may be disrupted by breaking up the team, the approach is manpower intensive and requires component and directorate

representation in each COA group, and there is an increased likelihood that COAs will not be distinctive. While there is potential time to be saved, experience has demonstrated that it is *not an automatic result*. The simultaneous COA development approach can work, but its inherent disadvantages must be addressed and some risk accepted up front. The alternative approach is to have the entire JPG work on COAs sequentially. This significantly reduces the manpower requirements but may result in less fully developed COAs. Regardless of the method chosen, the keys to success are: thorough mission analysis, specific planning guidance, and continuous engagement by the leadership.

(4) Time available, the Commander, and the nature of the mission will dictate the number of COAs to be considered. Staff sections continually affect course of action development by an ongoing staff estimate process to ensure adequate (accomplishes the mission), feasibility (required resources are available), acceptability (risk is acceptable), variety (viable alternatives that meet the other criteria), completeness (answers Who, What, When, Where, How), and complies with Joint Doctrine. The variability or distinctiveness of each COA is ensured by emphasizing distinctions in regard to:

- focus of direction of the main effort
- scheme of maneuver (air, land, maritime)
- task organization, phasing (if required)
- anticipated use of reserves
- primary defeat mechanism or primary method of mission accomplishment, and/or
- important logistic matters.

(5) COA Development Considerations.

- Review mission analysis and commander's guidance.
- Brainstorm options. Potential COAs may be based on varied use of forces (ARFOR, MARFOR, etc.) or varied use of operating systems (Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Command and Control, or Force Protection).
- Test drafts against following criteria:
 - Adequate: Does the COA accomplish the mission? Does it address the essential tasks, meet the Commander's intent, and achieve the desired end state?
 - Feasibility: Addresses whether or not the CJTF has the necessary forces and resources to accomplish the mission. "Can the JTF get to the desired end state from here"?

- Acceptability: Does the COA fall within the parameters of an acceptable level of risk? Risk may be assessed on force protection, mission accomplishment, U.S. or international public and media opinion, or other factors.
- Variety: Are the COAs distinguishable? Valid distinguishing characteristics of COAs include simultaneous and sequential operations, task organization, scheme of maneuver, defeat mechanism, or main effort.
- Completeness: Does the COA answer the question of Who, What, When, Where, and How?

- Determine Command relationships.
- Prepare COA Concept of Operations, Movement and maneuver sketch, and Tasks to subordinates.
- Other Considerations: COAs should attempt to preserve flexibility for the Commander well into the operation and be dependent upon the fewest assumptions. Each COA should create combat power asymmetries which the CJTF can exploit for success.

(d) Course of Action Analysis. Course of action analysis or wargaming is a process whereby each COA is visualized in context of the enemy's most likely or most dangerous course of action in an action-reaction-counteraction methodology. The COA Analysis process is the staff's visualization of the flow of an operation and is an important step in building decision support tools for the Commander. While time consuming, this procedure reveals strengths and weaknesses of each friendly course of action, anticipates battlefield events, determines task organization for combat, identifies decision points, and identifies cross-service or component support requirements.

(1) There are two key decisions to make before COA analysis begins. The first decision is to decide what type of wargame will be used. This decision should be based on Commander's guidance, time and resources available, staff expertise, and availability of simulation models. The second decision is to prioritize the enemy COAs the wargame is to be analyzed against. In time constrained situations it may not be possible to wargame against all courses of action.

(2) Two methods of wargaming are available: Computer-assisted and manual wargaming. The method chosen depends on available resources, staff expertise, time available, and desired degree of resolution. Consider using a methodology that

permits analysis of actions in time and space from a perspective of operational phases or critical events.

(3) Interpret the results of analysis: Comparisons of advantages and disadvantages of each COA will be conducted during the next step of the estimate. However, if the unsuitability, infeasibility, or unacceptableness of any COA becomes readily apparent during the analysis, the commander should modify or discard it and concentrate on other COA(s). The need to create additional combinations of COAs may also become apparent.

(4) COA Analysis Considerations.

- Information Review: Mission Analysis, Commander's intent, planning guidance, CINC's orders.
- Gather tools, materials, personnel and data:
 - Friendly courses of action to be analyzed;
 - Enemy courses of action against which you will evaluate the friendly COAs;
 - Representations of the operational area such as maps, overlays, etc.;
 - Representations of friendly and enemy force dispositions and capabilities;
 - Subject matter experts (INTEL, SJA, POLAD, Log, IW, C4, PAO, etc.);
 - Red cell; and
 - Scribe/recorder.
- Select method of wargame (manual or computer assisted).
 - Pre-conditions or start points and endstate for each phase;
 - Advantages/disadvantages of the COA;
 - Unresolved issues;
 - COA modifications or refinements;
 - Estimated duration of critical events;
 - Major tasks for components;
 - Identify critical events & decision points;
 - Identify branches and sequels;
 - Identify risks;
 - Recommended EEIs and supporting collections plan priorities; and
 - Highlight ROE requirements.
- Keep discussions elevated to the theater level.
- Balance between stifling creativity and making progress.
- Ensure the deception plan is woven into the analysis.

(e) COA Comparison. The COA comparison process evaluates each of the COAs against functional criteria. The inputs to COA comparison are the wargame results and staff estimates of supportability. Participation in the comparison process is directed by the CINC. It is normally conducted by the principal staff directors and may include the components. As in COA analysis, COA comparison requires some preparation time on the part of the staff. The staff must have a thorough understanding of each course of action. This may require additional briefings, particularly if the principal staff directors were not involved in the wargaming exercises. The end state of the comparison process is a recommendation on the preferred COA to the CINC.

(1) COAs are not compared to each other. Each COA is considered independently of the other COAs and is compared to a set of criteria or governing factors. Some of these criteria may be directed by the CINC, but most criteria will be developed on the basis of the staff section's area of cognizance. COA comparison facilitates the Commander's decision making process by balancing the **ends, means, ways and risk** of each COAs. Each staff principal is responsible for the development of comparison criteria for its functional area of interest that will be used throughout this process. The actual comparison process is conducted by the individual staff section in *isolation* and the *results* are briefed in terms of recommended COA advantages/disadvantages.

(2) The staff should remain as objective as possible in comparing the COAs. Several techniques for evaluating COAs are available. Weighting criteria is a frequently used technique, and numerical summaries can be used to reach recommendations. Experience has been that COA comparison remains a subjective process and should not be turned into a mathematical equation. Using +,-,0 is as appropriate as any other method. The key element in this process is the ability to articulate to the Commander why one COA is preferred over another.

(f) COA Recommendation. Throughout the COA development process, the Cinc has been conducting an independent analysis of the mission, possible courses of action, and relative merits and risks associated with each COA. The Commander's analysis is combined with staff estimates and the staff's recommended COA and results in a selected COA.

(1) The forum for presenting the results of COA comparison is the Commander's Decision Brief. Typically this briefing provides the CINC with an update of the current situation, an overview of the COAs considered, and a discussion of the results of COA comparison. The JPG chief or the Chief of Staff may facilitate the decision brief. Normally, each staff principal and component liaison will describe their comparison criteria and results. The component commanders and their staff principals may be linked with the Headquarters by Video Teleconference (VTC) in order to provide direct feedback to the Commander.

(2) Once the CINC has made a decision on a selected COA, provides guidance, and updates his intent, the staff completes the Commander's Estimate. The Commander's Estimate provides a concise statement of how the CINC intends to accomplish the mission, and provides the necessary focus for campaign planning and OPLAN/OPORD development. Further, it replies to the establishing authority's requirement to develop a plan for execution. Annex D of JOPES Volume I (CJCSI 3122.01) provides the format for the Commander's Estimate. (See also the Naval War College's, *Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES)* and AFSC Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide*, 1997, pp. 6-32 to 6-41 and Appendix F).

(e) Strategic Concept. The CINCs selected COA is developed into the strategic concept of unified operations for the campaign plan by expanding and refining the tentative concept.

(1) In the strategic concept, the commander provides visualization for subordinates on conducting campaigns, major operations, and the decisive battle, focusing on the employment of the force as a whole. The geographic combatant commander will communicate operation phasing, intent of individual phases of the campaign, and the measurement for when transition between phases occurs. This description includes conditions to be achieved, sequencing of events, and expected enemy reactions to friendly forces as the campaign unfolds. Above all, the commander should specify the desired military end state and the battle results expected, including effects on the enemy and the desired posture of friendly forces at the end of combat operations. The commander should describe how this posture will facilitate transition to future operations or post-conflict operations.

(2) Methods of support for the joint force will be specified in the logistics concept. It is derived from the logistic estimate of supportability for the selected COA along with consideration of the throughput system—the transportation and distribution system that provides the means to move the joint force and materiel resources forward and evacuation to rear area as required. The logistic concept is more than gathering information on the various logistics functions. Rather, it entails the organization of capabilities and resources into an overall theater campaign support concept.

(1) Considerations for the Strategic Concept include:

- Applies the concepts of operational art. (For an expanded discussion of the fundamental elements of operational art see JP 3-0, PP.III-9 to III-24.)
- Describes the theater concept, objectives, and tasks and supporting operational direction, objectives, tasks, and concepts for subordinates to carry out their campaigns or major operations.
- Organizes joint, single-service, supporting, and special operations forces—in conjunction with multinational, interagency, non-governmental, private voluntary organizations, or United Nations forces—into a cohesive force designed to plan and execute subordinate campaigns and operations.
- Retains strategic reserves.
- Establishes command relationships.
- Integrates the nation's mobilization, deployment, and sustainment efforts into the geographic combatant commanders' employment and logistics concepts.
- Concentrates forces and materiel resources strategically so that the right force is available at the designated times and places to conduct decisive operations.
- Seeks to gain the strategic advantage over the enemy that affords an opportunity to take the strategic initiative through offensive operations.
- Defeats or destroys the enemy's strategic centers of gravity or achieves desired MOOTW objectives to achieve the strategic end state.

(f) Objectives and Subordinate Tasks. The theater and supporting operational objectives assigned to subordinates are critical elements of the theater-strategic design of the

campaign. They establish the conditions necessary to reach the desired end state and achieve the national strategic objectives. The geographic combatant commander focuses on national military or multinational objectives to select theater-strategic and supporting operational objectives. Subordinate JFCs, in turn, are assigned specific theater strategic and supporting operational objectives for subordinate campaigns. The geographic combatant commander carefully defines the objectives to ensure clarity of theater and operational intent and to identify specific tasks required to achieve those objectives.

(1) Prioritization of campaign objectives must take account of pertinent NCA and theater guidance. As time permits, the geographic combatant commander will consider input from external agencies when it is made available.

(2) Tasks for subordinates are determined to accomplish the theater campaign military objectives and achieve the desired end state. Tasks are derived from the theater military objectives. They are shaped by the concept of operations—intended sequencing and integration of air, land, sea, special operations, and space forces. Tasks are prioritized in order of criticality while considering the enemy's priorities and the need to gain advantage.

(3) One of the fundamental purposes of a campaign plan is to achieve synchronized employment of all available land, sea, and air forces. This overwhelming application of military force can be achieved by the assigning the appropriate tasks to components for each phase. These tasks can be derived from an understanding of how land, sea, and air forces interrelate, not only among themselves, but also with respect to the enemy. The components have symmetrical relationships with equivalent enemy forces, mutual support relationships with each other, as well as asymmetrical relationships with other types of enemy forces. A framework for depicting this interdependency of air, land, and sea forces is depicted in Figures 5-7. (See AFSC Pub 2, August 1992, Part II, Chapter 4 for more on this concept.)

- Figure 5 shows the symmetrical relationship of land forces primary task of seeking land control from opposing enemy land forces while the air and sea forces perform the same symmetrical function in their respective regimes.

SYMMETRICAL RELATIONSHIPS




Figure 5

This has been the traditional view of warfare from service perspectives and has been exemplified by classic land battles such as between Grant and Lee in the American Civil War or by classic naval and air battles such as the Battles of Jutland (1916) and Britain (1940).

- Figure 6 depicts the primary mutual support relationships requiring close coordination whereby the JFLCC provides suppression of enemy air defenses (such as by AH-64 or ATACMS in Desert Storm) as well as seizing and holding ports and airbases for friendly air and sea forces (such as in Just Cause).

MUTUAL SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS




Figure 6

- Likewise, the JFLCC can expect to receive closely coordinated tactical air support (to include airlift and CAS) from the air component and power projection support (to include Naval Air, Naval Gunfire, and Sea Lines of Communication force deployment and Sustainment) from the naval component.
- Finally, the JFLCC can be tasked to conduct asymmetrical operations not requiring close coordination as depicted in Figure 7.

ASSYMETRICAL RELATIONSHIPS




Figure 7

- These may be against enemy ports and airbases directly (as with the elimination of German submarine and V-1/2 bases in France in 1944). Land based elements may conduct air/missile defense operations to deny or reduce the enemy's air effects (as performed by Patriot batteries in Saudi Arabia and Israel in Desert Storm). Similarly, the JFLCC can request from the JFC air interdiction and naval deep strike operations (TLAM, carrier air, etc.) to asymmetrically attack or isolate enemy land forces deep.

(g) Joint Force Organization. Organizations and relationships are based on the campaign design, complexity of the campaign, and degree of control required. Within the campaign decision-making process, the geographic combatant commander determines the organization and command relationships after assigning tasks to subordinates. The establishment of command relationships includes determining the types of subordinate commands and the degree of authority to be delegated to each. Clear definition of command relationships further clarifies the intent of the geographic combatant commander and contributes to decentralized execution and unity of effort. The geographic combatant commander has the authority to determine the types of subordinate commands from several doctrinal options, including Service components, functional commands, and subordinate joint

commands. The options for delegating authority emanate from COCOM and range from OPCON to support.

(1) Service Components. All joint forces include Service components. Administrative and logistic support is provided through these Service components. Conducting operations through Service components has certain advantages, which include clear and uncomplicated command lines. (See JP 3-0, pp. II-13, 14.)

(2) Functional Components. JFCs may establish functional components to provide centralized direction and control of certain functions and types of operations. Functional componentcy can be appropriate when forces from two or more services operate in the same dimension or medium. Normal functional components include Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC), Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), and Joint Force Special Operations Commander (JFSOCC). Other emerging functional components include Joint Forces Information Warfare Commander (JFIWC) used by 2d Fleet and Joint Forces Space Component Commander (JFSCC) proposed by SPACECOM.

(3) Considerations for Joint Force Organization.

- JFCs will normally designate JFACCs and organize special operations forces into a functional component. (JP 3-0)
- Joint Forces will normally be organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities. (JP 3-0)
- Functional component staffs should be joint with Service representation in approximate proportion to the mix of subordinate forces. These staffs will be required to be organized and trained prior to employment in order to be efficient and effective, which will require advanced planning.
- CINCs may establish supporting/supported relationships between components to facilitate operations.
- CINCs define the authority and responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the strategic concept of operations and may alter their authority and responsibility during the course of an operation.
- Theater CINCs must balance the need for centralized direction with decentralized execution.

- Major changes in the Joint Force organization is normally conducted at phase changes.

(h) Requirements for Supporting Plans. The geographic combatant commander, Service component commanders, functional component commanders, and subordinate JFCs consider a total resource support concept that is integrated, vertically and horizontally, into supporting plans for theater and subordinate campaigns or major operations. The geographic combatant commander and subordinate JFCs and their staffs develop these plans based on unified support that can be provided from national-level assets, supporting combatant commanders, Service and functional components, alliance or coalition partners, other government agencies, non-government or private agencies, international agencies, United Nations efforts, and host nations.

(1) Supporting plans may address tasks and support requirements during mobilization, predeployment, deployment, force projection operations, employment, post-conflict operations, redeployment, and demobilization. They address requirements for political, informational, as well as economic coordination and support. Detailed support during the various phases of the theater campaign is also contained in a supporting plan.

(2) Supporting commanders synchronize their plans with the theater campaign plan. They time-sequence mobilization to support employment, deployment and force projection with employment, and employment with execution, execution with sustainment, and vice versa. They identify resources and necessary liaison early, as the plan is being developed. Supporting plans provide for liaison from the supporting to the supported geographic combatant commander who controls all support into the theater. Coordination will be required with allies, coalition forces, and host nations on intra-theater movements. Plans to effect intra-theater movement should provide the geographic combatant commander the maximum possible control of the movement and concentration of forces and materiel, which will permit rapid response to changing situations as the campaign develops.

(3) Supporting and subordinate commanders and supporting U.S. departments and agencies use the geographic combatant commander's strategic concepts of operation and tasks for subordinates as the basis for determining the necessary support for each phase of the campaign plan. Supporting and subordinate commanders respond to the identified tasks by preparing

supporting plans and submitting them for approval to the supported geographic combatant commander.

(4) Considerations for supporting plans.

- The geographic combatant commander identifies space and intelligence support requirements for the campaign through the development or revalidation of a supporting space and/or intelligence plan. This plan will identify requirements for national-level support from DOD intelligence agencies, NRO, NIMA, SPACECOM, and the military Services.
- Through the development of a mobility plan and a civil engineering support plan, the geographic combatant commander identifies engineer requirements for strategic and operational mobility, construction, and real estate for the campaign. These plans will identify requirements for national-level support from non-DOD government agencies and the Services.
- Strategic Command and Special Operations Command may prepare supporting plans for the employment of unique forces from their commands in support of a theater campaign plan.
- Functional supporting major operations plans. JP 3-56.1 describes the Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP) as the functional plan required to be prepared by the JFACC. Similarly, NDP 5 refers to a Naval Operations Plan to be prepared by a Naval Component Commander. By analogy, the JFLCC and the JFSOCC should prepare Joint Land Operations Plans and Joint Special Operations Plans respectively.

(i) Flexible Campaign Plan. The campaign plan must be both feasible and adaptable. The plan must have attainable goals and be adaptable to changing guidance or situations affecting the desired outcome. It should be continually reviewed and revised as required to remain current and viable. According to JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, the campaign plan itself can be brief, though implementing orders will usually be longer.

(1) A common approach to command and control calls for the commander to assign the future planning effort to the long range planning element (LRPE) of the J5, Chief of Plans and Policy. The LRPE coordinates with outside agencies and higher headquarters to develop future plans, and passes completed plans to the J3, Operations Officer, for synchronization and execution phase coordination. Many J3s organize their directorates into

multiple sections, whereby, for instance, the operations planning element (OPE) assumes responsibility for the development of branches to current phases, and the current operations section staffs the Joint Operations Center (JOC). Frequently, the J3 will also head the Joint Planning Group (JPG) composed of the LRPE and the OPE. This division of labor permits the JFC to maintain focus on the whole operation of the joint force in time, space, and function. Accordingly, decisions can be made, staff action completed, and subordinates given warning orders as soon as possible. The deputy JFC (or DCINC) may have a key role to play in focusing on the high-priority synchronization efforts of the joint staff, for example, in closing any seams among component concepts of operations through the JTCCB or other mechanisms. This approach proved successful in operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Iraq.

(2) Anticipation is singularly important in joint operations. Oriented principally toward the operational level of war the CINC and the joint force staff do not normally direct tactical operations. They must be anticipating potential future actions, then allow time for subordinate commanders to conduct their own detailed planning and coordination. In a practical sense, this means that CINCs must focus their decision-making efforts as far into the future as possible, but in most cases at least days or weeks in advance. Figure 8 below illustrates a conceptual division of labor depicting JFC battlestaff planning to focus on future events. In this example, the joint force J5 supervises the refinement of the planning of subsequent phases and looks out to posthostilities. COAs, opportunities, decision points, and branches and sequels for these phases are then briefed to the JFC to ensure actions are taken in a timely manner. The JFC gives guidance to the JPG and decides on courses of action. The deputy JFC oversees the synchronization of planning efforts through required boards and functions, and ascertains that synchronization has been completed prior to execution.

JFC BATTLESTAFF PLANNING




Figure 8, JFC Battlestaff Planning

(3) The J3 synchronizes current operations during execution, monitoring the situation and ensuring that the commander and particular staff sections are aware of the current situation. The full staff supports these actions by participating in the JPG, synchronization boards and centers and coordination cells. The J5 is responsible for long range or phase transition planning. As the conditions are being set for transition to a new phase of the operation, the J5 planning results are handed over to the J3 planners. The J3 prepares implementing orders (FRAGOs) and decision support tools as well as tracking movements and preparing reports. Upon CINC decision to execute a branch plan or phase transition, the plans are turned over to the Joint Operations Center (JOC) for execution. Regardless of the planning organization the CINC decides to adopt for the execution, it is essential that the CINC maintain an element focused beyond the current battle. The tendency is for everyone to become so involved in the current battle so as to be unprepared for branch contingencies or phase transitions. The command must be prepared to exploit opportunities and minimize operational reversals. The best preparation is to anticipate these situations and plan for their execution.

(4) Once the CINC has completed the theater campaign plan and the necessary OPORDs or OPLANS have been published, the focus turns to branch and sequel planning. Normally this type of planning will be conducted by a smaller planning cell. The entire theater JPG is assembled only under specific circumstances, such as wargaming a branch or sequel plan. This is in consideration of the duties and responsibilities of LNOs and other representatives during the Execution. The JPG Chief should continue to hold synchronization meetings during execution. These meetings serve several purposes. First, the JPG is brought up-to-date on the current situation. This will help in prioritization of the planning effort. Second, the JOC and component LNOs are made aware of the status of branch and sequel plans under development.

IV. Summary of Theater Campaign Planning.

a. Theater campaign plans implement national strategic direction and ensure the integration and support of the application of the elements of national power in a crisis. Since the theater commander must employ the forces assigned or allocated to the command, he must provide those forces with strategic direction and operational focus to achieve the military end state in support of the strategic end state for any given crisis. The most comprehensive direction is contained in a theater campaign plan. A theater campaign can be designed for a crisis in peacetime, conflict or war. (See Figure 9 for Fundamentals of Campaign Plans)

b. Theater campaign planning is accomplished within the Joint Operations Planning System to ensure the development and integration of a family of regional plans involving all the key players in a crisis. Normally, campaign plans are modified and completed during crisis action planning. Theater campaign plans defeat the enemy's strategy and accomplish the end state required by the National Command Authority. A theater campaign plan would normally incorporate a wide range of unified operations and forces including joint, single-service, multinational, interagency, United Nations, international, non-governmental and private voluntary perspectives.

c. Supporting plans are developed to complement and support the theater campaign plan in all of its dimensions. Supporting combatant commanders and subordinate commanders each develop their own plans following the direction of the theater campaign plan. All other forces involved in the situation likewise

develop their own plans in direct support or in parallel support of the theater campaign plan. A multinational coordination center can assist in this process and even translate the plans into the appropriate languages.

Figure 9 **Fundamentals of Campaign Plans** (JP 3-0/5-0)

- Provide broad strategic concepts of operations and sustainment for achieving multinational, national, and theater strategic objectives.
- Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.
- Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces, in conjunction with interagency, multinational, non-governmental, private voluntary, or United Nations forces, as required.
- Incorporate the combatant commander's strategic intent and operational focus.
- Identify any special forces or capabilities the enemy has in the area.
- Identify the enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance for defeating them.
- Identify the friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance to subordinates for protecting them.
- Sequence a series of related major joint operations conducted simultaneously in depth.
- Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designate command relationships.
- Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination objectives and potential posthostilities activities.
- Provide strategic direction; operational focus; and major tasks, objectives, and concepts to subordinates.
- Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons as required by the National Command Authorities.

This pamphlet will be revised as necessary.

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